Rescue craft head toward the pall of smoke that is Spartan.
(Courtesy of Mr F Fairclough.)

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DNC 6/R.322

REPORT BY THE ADMIRALTY
DEPARTMENT OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION

1. CIRCUMSTANCES


At 1730 on the 29th January, 1944, SPARTAN anchored in six fathoms of water, in position 41 degrees 26.2' N, 12 degrees 41.2' E, off the port of ANZIO, to provide AA protection for ships in the vicinity of the beachhead in accordance with orders from Commander Task Force (CTF) 81. The wind was about force 4 and weather conditions were generally favourable.

2. NARRATIVE


Soon after anchoring, in position 105 degrees, 2.2 miles from the light on ANZIO Breakwater, at 1750, that is about 35 minutes after sunset, air raid warning "red ANZIO" was received.

Immediately after this about four aircraft were seen flying low (at about 5,000 feet) a few miles inland, and approximately five glider bombs (Hs 293) were also seen. It was dark overland in the direction of the attack and SPARTAN was unable to identify the aircraft.

SPARTAN engaged the aircraft, which were on her starboard beam, and shortly afterwards, at approximately 1756, another glider bomb was seen approaching the starboard side of the ship. This bomb was engaged by close range anti-aircraft fire; it was first thought likely to miss astern but is reported to have altered course during the final stage of its approach.

Shortly after this the bomb struck the ship at the after end of "B" funnel casing, started a heavy fire in the vicinity, the projectile passed through the ship and exploded high up on the port side of the main watertight sub-division containing "B" Boiler Room.

Smoke cover had been ordered but had not become effective by the time SPARTAN was hit.

Operation Shingle

3. TYPE OF WEAPON


The Hs 293 was a monoplane glider of about 10 feet wing span, 10 feet overall length and a tail plane span of 40 inches. It incorporated a special 500 Kg warhead in the nose and was propelled by a jet propulsion unit (burning a liquid fuel) slung below the glider; its average speed was 325 knots. The warhead was filled either with 273 Kg of Amatol or 327 kg of Trialon.

As this was one of the later bombs used, the filling was probably the latter.

The weapon was radio controlled by the operator in the releasing aircraft. It could be manoeuvred in the same way as an aircraft and made little audible noise in flight. It carried a red and green flare in the tail for day attacks and an electric lamp for night attacks.

The Henschel Hs 293

This speciman is at the Royal Airforce Museum, Cosford.

4. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS


4.1 As a result of the explosion, "B" Boiler Room and compartments abreast it on the port side (including the main switchboard room) flooded rapidly.

The main bulkhead stop valve between "A" Boiler Room and "A" Engine Room was closed (probably by shock) and accordingly all steam and electric power was lost.

SPARTAN was thereby immobilized and all lighting, pumping and ventilation failed throughout the ship.

4.2 The port lower deck space over "B" Boiler Room became filled with smoke and steam, and was inaccessible; the lower deck spaces 83 to 99 and 117 to 135 were also troubled with acrid smoke and steam.

Emergency lighting was available in the forward spaces.

4.3 The explosion wrecked the port torpedo tubes, and some of the air vessels exploded and blew warheads aft into the recreation space between "X" turret and the main mast; these burning warheads started a large fire in the vicinity of the after galley and recreation space.

4.4 Telephonic conversation with DC 2 (117-135 Lower Deck) was interrupted, the SR Equipment was put out of action, and fires, exploding ammunition, fallen mast, damaged torpedo tubes and general debris in the way of the after deckhouse, made communications with the after end difficult.

4.5 By 1800 the heel was between 5 and 10 degrees to port, and the water line was above the lower deck side.

Lower Deck spaces on the port side, between stations 83 to 99 and 117 to 135, flooded because of the explosion had strained the port sides of the transverse bulkheads at 99 and 117, above the lower deck.

The lack of power prevented any effective counter-flooding action or transfer of liquids.

4.6 A splinter was projected into "Y" turret, possibly by the explosion of the bomb but more probably by the explosion of the torpedo air vessels or warheads and a small fire was started amongst the ready use ammunition in the turret.

Orders were therefore given for the flooding of "X" and "Y" magazines.

It is reported that these magazines were flooded by 1815; by which time the heel was 15 degrees to port, from which it is clear there was some other compartment flooding.

There is evidence that there was slight flooding in the Forward Engine Room through a ventilation trunk, but it is also probable that there was considerable flooding in the After Engine Room, which had been evacuated at 1805 and was never subsequently inspected for flooding.

4.7 Shortly after the explosion, the small diesel engine dynamo (Platform Deck Stations 68 to 74) was started up and after an interval pressure was restored to the forward section of the fire main; hoses were then rigged from forward to the seat of the fire.

Between 1800 and 1805 the After Engine Room and the Lower Deck Space 117 to 135 were evacuated and between 1810 and 1815 a fire fighting tug closed the ship and assisted in fighting the fire.

4.8 The list remained practically constant from 1815 until 1840, by which time it had increased slightly to 18 degrees.

4.9 Between 1815 and 1820, steam was restored to the Forward Engine Room and number one turbo-generator was re-started, but this dynamo was not connected to the ring main because water leaking down from a vent trunk from the Lower Deck Flat over was splashing over the supply switch gear.

At about 1825, steam was also supplied to number three turbo-generator but no ratings were available to connect this dynamo to the ring main.

4.10 After 1840 SPARTAN began to heel more rapidly, suggesting that flooding then began to take place somewhere else.

The damaged water-line at 18 degrees cuts across the bottom of the extraction doors in "Y" ring bulkhead on the Lower Deck. If these doors had been left open and the valves for flooding "X" and "Y" magazines had not been shut off when the magazines filled, as soon as the water-line reached the bottom of these doors the lower deck space 135 to 157 would have commenced to flood and caused a rapid increase in heel.

Calculations show with the ship in the state assumed, that is, after unit and port spaces abreast flooded, and after magazine block flooded, the addition of 180 tons of water in this space would have increased the heel from 18 to 28 degrees.

By 1900 the list had increased to 30 degrees and, shortly after this the order was given to abandon ship. (At this angle water would have been rushing into the Forward Engine Room and any hope of saving the ship would be lost.)

When the list had increased to 35 degrees orders were given for all magazine crews and all below decks not employed in damage control to come up on deck. By 1905 she was on her beam ends and she sank at 1915 in six fathoms of water.